Though several regiments of black troops had already proven that they would fight, Union officers doubted the ability of southern fugitives, recently freed from slavery. Louisiana black soldiers fared well in the Battles of Port Hudson and Milliken's Bend in May and June 1863, respectively. In July the 54th Massachusetts made a heroic assault on Fort Wagner, near Charleston, and the 1st Kansas Colored Regiment of Volunteers received recognition for its valiant efforts in the Battle of Honey Springs. The majority of black soldiers who fought in these battles were recruited from the free black populations in the respective states.

Southern troops consisting predominantly of slaves and contraband had not yet engaged the enemy in a major conflict. ¹ The 1st South Carolina Colored Regiment of Volunteers, a regiment similar in nature to the 1st NCCV, successfully completed excursions up the St. Mary's River and along the coasts of Florida and Georgia, but it only met small numbers of the enemy. What would be the outcome when ex-slaves confronted hardened Confederate veterans in the heat of battle? Needless to say, most wagered that southern blacks would not fare well under the pressures of warfare. The first test for the men of the 1st NCCV came in Olustee, Florida.

Florida lay isolated from the affairs of the war when Union troops were recalled from Jacksonville in March 1863. Later that year several factors brought the southern state once again onto center stage. The Lincoln administration and other officials hoped to establish a loyal state government somewhere in the South. According to reports, Florida had potential for such a purpose. Florida also had become a major food source for the Confederate army, and in, order to expedite shipping, the Confederates had planned to upgrade Florida's rail system.

Confederate Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones recalled how the coming election year of 1864 redirected Union strategy. Jones wrote that if a southern state could be brought under the control of the Union army in order to form a "quasi State Government" that would recognize the authority of the United States, the state could be represented in the approaching nominating convention and take part in upcoming elections. Jones regarded Florida as an ideal state for such a purpose. Not only had the Confederate Army stripped Florida of its forces, but its long, extended coast line made it impractical to defend against Union invasions, and its deep, broad rivers made it easy to traverse the interior. Another factor with even greater appeal, Jones noted, was the Confederacy's access to Florida's food supplies by railroad. ²

By the end of 1863, much of the Confederacy's commissary supplies came from Florida. If Union troops could land near Jacksonville, penetrate to a point in the interior, and destroy the railroads and bridges near the Suwanee River, the Confederacy would not only be "deprived of a large quantity of the food drawn from east and southern Florida, but a point d'appui would be established" for inhabitants desiring to organize a loyal state to join the Union. ³

Federal Brig. Gen. D. P. Woodbury, commander of the District of Key West and Tortugas, noted the Confederacy's dependence on Florida to feed its soldiers. "Two thousand head of cattle are reported to be driven out of Florida every week for the use of the rebel armies," he wrote. "Probably half of these cattle are driven from Middle and Lower Florida." Woodbury inserted an extract from a Florida newspaper that included instructions to commissary agents, warning them of the impending crisis of the Confederacy's food supply. Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, commander of the Department of the Gulf, endorsed the letter: "If the supply of beef in Florida be of importance to our army, a force should be sent there sufficiently large to scour the country." ⁴

In November 1863, Maj. P. W. White, Florida's chief commissary officer, issued a confidential circular letter appealing to Floridians to contribute foodstuffs desperately needed by the Confederacy. He pointed out that to inform the people of Florida of the "present perilous condition of our army" in the public press would expose the Rebels' "source of danger" to their enemies. He included letters received from other commissary officers, two from Maj. J. F. Cummings under General Braxton Bragg. On October 5, 1863, Cummings had written, "I cannot too strongly urge upon you the necessity . . . of sending forward cattle promptly. It appears that all other resources are exhausted and that we are now dependent upon your state for beef for the very large army of General Bragg." Another letter from Maj. M. B. Millen from Savannah stated, "Starvation stares the army in the face; the handwriting is on the wall." Later Millen wrote, "I have exhausted the beef-cattle, and am now obliged to kill stock-cattle." ⁵ Unauthorized copies of the circular were posted on trees throughout Florida, making the letter publicly known. Though none of the Federal officers mentioned the circular, Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard, commander of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, blamed it for the Federal expedition into Florida. ⁶

Florida's rail system in itself posed little threat to the Union army. However, the Confederate Army wished to reassemble unused portions of railroads in order to connect the Georgia and Florida systems, speeding the shipment of beef to the rest of the army. A private owner who effectively diverted efforts to tear up his railroad delayed the link up until 1865. Nevertheless, the seizure of Florida's rail system was a legitimate Union objective. Destruction of the railway bridge on the connector line headed toward the Georgia line would perpetuate the existing gap between the Georgia and Florida rail systems. Also, the destruction of the rail bridge near the Suwanee River west of Lake City would disrupt lines of communication between east and middle Florida. ⁷

Several towns along Florida's rail system served as collection sites for Confederate commissary agents. The rail-junction town of Baldwin ten miles west of Jacksonville was one collection point that would best serve as a base for the Federals. Gunboats and steamers traveling up the St. John's River could land a short marching distance from the town. For these reasons, a large Federal force, including the 1st NCCV, would be sent on an expedition into Florida. Reinforcements for the few, scattered rebel forces would take time because of the poor transportation system. ⁸

President Lincoln authorized Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore, commander of the Department of the South, to establish a loyal state government in Florida. ⁹ Gillmore requested that newly formed black regiments be sent to the Department of the South in order to occupy Florida. He proposed to land troops on the west bank of the St. John's River, conduct raids into the interior with seasoned troops, and establish posts garrisoned by black units. Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief, questioned the military importance of Gillmore's operation. If successful, he contended, it would merely use up valuable troops in garrison duty. The whole expedition would have little effect, militarily, on the progress of the war. ¹⁰

General Gillmore clearly outlined four objectives for the expedition: first, to procure an outlet for cotton and naval stores and various products gathered by Union loyalists and troops; second, to cut off the enemy's sources of commissary supplies; third, to obtain recruits for the black regiments; and fourth, to restore Florida's allegiance to the Union in accordance to Lincoln's instructions. ¹¹

Gillmore began organizing the men in his department for their departure. An unusual factor in Gillmore's expedition was the fact that his brigade commanders were colonels, normally regimental commanders, and not experienced generals. Also, Gillmore had planned to use only veteran troops for raiding purposes and spare green troops to garrison the newly established posts. Several regiments of inexperienced troops, including the 1st NCCV, soon found themselves on the road to Olustee. Furthermore, a shortage of horses left Gillmore with fewer mounted troops than he desired. These became significant factors when the Federal expedition confronted a large Confederate force at Olustee. ¹²

Gillmore placed Maj. Gen. Truman Seymour in command of the expedition that sailed up the St. John's River on February 7, 1864. Col. Guy V. Henry commanded the cavalry that pushed westward from Jacksonville along the railroad, capturing large amounts of stores and eight pieces of field artillery at Camp Finegan. He reached Baldwin on the 9th where he encountered the enemy and seized more rebel property and supplies. Gillmore accompanied General Seymour's troops when they joined Col. Henry's cavalry at Baldwin. Scattered fragments of Confederate Brig. Gen. Joseph Finegan's force posed the only threat to the Federals in east Florida. ¹³

Gillmore sent a portion of the Union forces to Sanderson, west of Baldwin, before returning to Jacksonville and ordered Seymour not to "risk a repulse in advancing on Lake City, but to hold Sanderson unless there were reasons for falling back which [he] did not know. .."¹⁴ Seymour protested, suggesting that the entire force be withdrawn from the interior and that only Jacksonville and a few other posts be held. He pointed out that any movement to the interior was not sound strategy. Not only would more men be necessary to support the operation, but Florida could not become a loyal state in its present condition. He felt that raiding the interior was only "frittering away the infantry." ¹⁵

Seymour apparently reversed his position on raiding the interior, however. On the 17th he wrote, "not enough supplies could be accumulated to permit me to execute my intentions of moving to Suwannee River. But now I propose to go without supplies. . . ." ¹⁶ Gillmore immediately dispatched his chief of staff, Brig. Gen. John Wesley Turner, to stop the movement. Bad weather delayed Turner for two days. Thus when he reached Jacksonville, Seymour had already engaged the enemy.

Seymour planned to move his troops to Barber's Plantation and from there push through the Rebels at Lake City. He would then send his mounted force on to destroy the railway bridge over the Suwanee River thirty miles beyond. ¹⁷ Col. Joseph R. Hawley, commander of a brigade during the battle, recalled a council of war held in Baldwin the day before the battle. According to Hawley, the officers concurred that it was infeasible to form a permanent line extending into the interior. The only source of communication would be a rickety one-engine railroad that could easily be disrupted by Rebel forces. Col. Hawley quoted one officer as saying, "The Confederates could have ruined us by letting us march one more day without interruption and then sitting down on the railroad between us and home." The officers unanimously voted for maintaining a position on the St. John's River near Jacksonville, but General Seymour continued with his plan.

On February 20 at 6 a.m., the Union force left Barber's Plantation on the South Fork of the St. Mary's. The Federals marched eighteen miles from Barber's to Olustee. Open pine forests provided good visibility for the Federal troops. The ground was low and flat, with few streams or undergrowth. Lakes and ponds offered the only natural defenses for an army, both of which were used at Olustee. The 1st NCCV had received its transfer orders and was now part of Seymour's force. ¹⁸ The entire Union army consisted of 5,500 men and officers and sixteen guns. Col. Henry's cavalry led the advance along with the 40th Massachusetts Mounted Infantry, two squadrons of the Independent Battalion Massachusetts Cavalry, commanded by Maj. Stevens, the 1st U. S. artillery with four guns, and Samuel Elder's Horse Battery B.

Col. Hawley followed the cavalry with his brigade: the 7th Connecticut, the 7th New Hampshire, and the 8th USCT, commanded by Capt. B. F. Skinner, Col. J. C. Abbott, and Col. Charles W. Fribley, respectively. Col. W. B. Barton led the second brigade, including the 47th New York Volunteers, the 48th and 115th New York commanded by Col. Henry Moore, Maj. W. B. Coan, and Col. Simeon Sammon, respectively. Col. James Montgomery brought up the rear leading the 54th Massachusetts, commanded by Col. E. N. Hallowell, the 55th Massachusetts (not engaged), commanded by Col. N. P. Hallowell, and the 1st NCCV, commanded by Col. W. N. Reed. Reed filled in for Col. Beecher who had previously gone north with dispatches.

Col. Hawley's brigade marched in three columns, the 7th New Hampshire and the 7th Connecticut on the right flank and the 8th USCT on the left. Barton's and Montgomery's brigade followed in like fashion. Tailing the infantry were Capt. John Hamilton's Light Battery "E", 3d U. S. Artillery; Capt. L. L. Langdon's Battery "M", 1st U. S. Artillery; and Lt. Henry H. Metcalf with one section of Battery "C", 3d Rhode Island Artillery. ¹⁹

Meanwhile, Confederate forces began converging upon Lake City. Four days after the Federals landed at Jacksonville, the Rebels had only six hundred infantry and cavalry and two guns in Florida. By the 19th, there were 5,200 Confederate infantry and cavalry and 3 batteries with 12 guns. Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Colquitt brought four infantry regiments from Savannah to join Finegan's force. His timely arrival was the major reason for the Confederate success at Olustee. ²⁰ The Rebels began their defensive works at Olustee Station on February 13 but never finished them. Their position was strong only if the enemy presented a frontal attack. It could easily be turned by a cautious commander. ²¹

General Finegan's force consisted of two brigades of infantry and one brigade of cavalry. Colquitt commanded the 6th, 19th, 23d, 27th, and 28th Georgia Regiments, the 6th Florida Regiment, and the Chatham Battery of Georgia Artillery. Col. George P. Harrison, Jr. commanded a brigade of the 32d and 64th Georgia Volunteers, the 1st Regiment Georgia Regulars, the 1st Florida Battalion, Bonaud's Battalion of Infantry, and Guerard's Light Battery. Col. Caraway Smith commanded the Confederate cavalry and the Florida Light Artillery remained unattached. ²²

The Union force marched with a lack of security. General Seymour failed to deploy flankers and the only advance guard to give warning was the cavalry. ²³ The correspondent for the New York Times reported that, "It would certainly be called a military failing to move a column of troops without the proper flankers through any portion of the enemy's country, even if positive information had been obtained that the enemy himself was a long distance off." ²⁴

General Finegan changed his original plan of drawing the Union force into his defensive works at Olustee. Instead, he moved the bulk of his force forward about three miles to meet the enemy. This move took the Federals completely by surprise.

At 3 p.m. on the 20th, after marching fifteen miles, Col. Henry's cavalry met the enemy's pickets a few miles east of Olustee. Two companies of the 7th Connecticut moved forward to drive them back. Seymour ordered Hawley to send the rest of the 7th Connecticut out in front with Henry's cavalry and the 40th Massachusetts Mounted Infantry. The advance continued, driving in the enemy's pickets. Three miles west of Olustee the advance guard met and drove back the enemy's cavalry. At this point, Seymour's force suddenly came upon the full extent of the Rebel line, ready to fire upon the Federals.

The 7th Connecticut fell back to consolidate the Union line, and the battle began. Hawley sent up the 7th New Hampshire on the right and the 8th USCT on the left. Hamilton and Langdon brought up their batteries in the center, abreast of Elder's horse battery. Minutes after the 7th New Hampshire deployed and engaged the enemy, Col. Abbott apparently misunderstood an order from Col. Hawley, and the whole regiment broke. The 7th New Hampshire reformed and performed well on the right flank, but the blunder was irreversible. The 7th Connecticut and the 8th USCT were temporarily left in front by themselves. ²⁵

Under intense fire, the 8th USCT stood its ground, but soon broke and fell back, but not before delivering an "exceedingly effective fire" against the enemy. ²⁶ Out of 550 men, 300 dead or wounded were left on the field. Col. Hawley learned after the battle that most of the men had not had a day's practice loading and firing their muskets. "Old troops, finding themselves so greatly over-matched, would have run a little and re-formed-with or without orders. The black men stood to be killed or wounded," he wrote after the war. Hawley insisted, contrary to some reports, that the black regiment reorganized once it fell back. ²⁷

With both flanking regiments gone, the artillery stood bare before the enemy. The artillery was within one hundred yards of the enemy line, making an easy target for the enemy's rifles. Before Hamilton could even unlimber his pieces, he was hit by "a galling fire of musketry." ²⁸ Seymour ordered up Barton's brigade to take the 7th New Hampshire's place and the 54th Massachusetts to fill in the left. It was too late, however, for the artillery to recover. Some of the horses in the confusion became unmanageable and locked the carriages against the trees. Hamilton was forced to leave five guns on the field in the hands of the Confederates.

Both Barton's brigade and the 54th Massachusetts received a galling round of musketry fire from the enemy. The left began to fall back when Seymour ordered up the 1st NCCV to take position left of Barton's brigade. Lt. Col. Reed, sword in hand, led the 1st NCCV in the "most brilliant manner" and charged upon the Rebels with all tenacity. By this time, however, the enemy had its entire force engaged and was in full momentum. ²⁹ The 1st NCCV and the 54th Massachusetts fought desperately to hold their ground, but the Confederates were too strong. Both regiments were overpowered by numbers, but "fell back in good order, and poured in a destructive fire. . . . The two colored regiments had stood in the gap, and saved the army!" ³⁰

The New York Times correspondent wrote, "They took a bold position at the front and maintained their ground with commendable pertinacity. . . . Never before did the blacks in this department have such an opportunity for displaying their valor, and on no previous occasion have they exhibited such a degree of bravery." ³¹ Another account of the 1st NCCV said, "It passes between the 47th and 48th on the double-quick, and is cheered by those retiring regiments as it goes into battle." The fresh troops and the manner of their approach momentarily staggered the enemy. The same account said that the 54th Massachusetts and the 1st NCCV even began to push back the enemy. It stated:

No regiment went into action more gallantly, fought more desperately, or did better execution than the First North Carolina (colored) troops. Their white comrades generally take pleasure in awarding to them this honor. Men were dropping constantly all along the line, but the living fought all the more bravely. These freedmen evidently preferred falling on the field of battle to falling into the hands of their barbarous foes. This regiment was not in action over two hours and a half, and yet its loss in officers and enlisted men was very nearly as heavy as that of any other regiment. ³²

According to Col. Beecher, not present during the battle, his regiment received "high encomium from the Genl. Comdg. and from all conversant with the matter." ³³

The 1st NCCV lost many of its officers and men. Lt. Col. Reed fell mortally wounded soon after the charge began. Adjutant William C. Manning was shot in the foot but insisted upon staying with the regiment. After receiving a second wound, an officer came to embrace him, imploring him to leave the field, but Manning refused. Maj. Archibald Bogle, wounded and taken captive, was mistakenly reported as killed in action by the correspondent for the New York Tribune, who also misspelled his name, "Major Boyle." ³⁴ Three captains and five lieutenants were wounded, and one captain was killed. According to the official report given by Seymour, a total of 230 enlisted men and 10 officers were killed, wounded, or listed as missing. ³⁵

At 5:30 p.m. the heavy firing ceased. The Federals held their ground until 7 o'clock, when General Seymour issued the order to retire. As the troops formed a new line, the regiments gave three successive cheers and fell back. The 7th Connecticut and Col. Henry's mounted force served as a rear-guard. The entire retreat was conducted at a leisurely pace and in good order, without confusion or panic. ³⁶ At 3 p.m., the Federals arrived at Barber's Plantation. There, they rested until 9 a.m. on Sunday, and then retreated to Baldwin where they stopped at 3 p.m. On Monday morning, they arrived within six miles of Jacksonville and camped.

The Rebels lost all opportunities of delivering a deadly blow to the Union troops when only two companies of cavalry halfheartedly followed the retreat. Colquitt repeatedly ordered Col. Caraway Smith, commanding the Confederate Cavalry Brigade, to pursue the enemy. Brig. Gen. Beauregard blamed Smith for an insignificant Rebel victory.

According to Col. Hawley, it was "a fair, square, stand-up fight in pine woods, just there not very thick, and having little undergrowth, save about an occasional swampy hole." ³⁷ The Confederates outnumbered the Federals by only three to five hundred men and formed a defensive line when the Federals rushed in. The defensive position of the Rebels, armed with "modern" weapons, gave them the edge. ³⁸

Some argue that in his efforts to compensate for his disaster at Fort Wagner, Seymour made an even worse blunder in Florida. ³⁹ Apparently he once again failed to bring up supporting regiments in time to form concentrated fire against the enemy. ⁴⁰ Seymour reported that the enemy's superior numbers were responsible for the Union defeat. "But the disparity in numbers was too great, and the defense too obstinate to permit of decisive results," Seymour wrote, or else the battle "might fairly have been a [Union] victory." ⁴¹ General Gillmore soon discovered that the opposing forces were even in numbers. In his endorsement of Seymour's report, he wrote, "Indeed, our forces appear to have been surprised into fighting, or attempting to fight, an offensive battle, in which the component parts of the command were beaten in detail. The enemy did not fight behind entrenchments or any kind of defenses." ⁴² Whatever the reasons, the Battle of Olustee proved to be one of the worst losses experienced by the Federals. It was the third bloodiest battle of the entire war for the Union army. Out of 5,115 men, 1,355 were killed or wounded, bringing the percentage lost to 26.5. The loss was exceeded only by the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Battle, where the Union lost 29.6 percent of its men, and the Battle of Port Hudson, where 26.7 percent were lost. ⁴³ The Federals ceased all major operations in Florida, realizing that little chance remained of it becoming a loyal state. ⁴⁴

Evidence suggests that wounded black soldiers were ill-treated by the Rebels. Brig. Gen. John P. Hatch, commanding the Coast Division, received reports that wounded black troops were murdered on the field. He accredited the aggression to the Georgia regulars and volunteers in Colquitt's brigade. The Florida troops, according to all of his accounts, did not participate in the offense. ⁴⁵ Twenty years after the war, Sgt. Henry Long of the 48th New York recalled how he had been wounded and left on the field overnight. Long remembered hearing Confederate soldiers cursing as they were ill-treating wounded black troops. ⁴⁶ No other documents were found that supported these allegations.

According to historian William Nulty, Seymour met a number of Gillmore's objectives in the Florida expedition. The Union troops forced the Rebels to divert 17,000 men from defending Charleston and Savannah and delayed critical reinforcements to the Confederate troops of Tennessee who were preventing a Union invasion of northwest Georgia. Though the Federals failed to destroy the important rail bridges, they did gain possession of key points in the Confederate rail system, briefly disrupting the supply line to two southern armies. Raiding parties effectively destroyed bridges and disrupted more Confederate supply lines after the battle. No figures are available to indicate the number of black enlistments who joined the Federal forces in Florida. However, the presence of black regiments signified to southern slaves the potential for freedom. Considering long range effects, and the characteristics of modern warfare, argues Nulty, the expedition met with some success. ⁴⁷

Historians who have been misinformed blame the black troops at Olustee for the Union defeat, accusing them of falling back at a critical juncture. In light of the available documentation, this allegation remains unsubstantiated. General Seymour commended the efforts of his black soldiers:

The colored troops behaved creditably-the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts and the First North Carolina like veterans. It was not in their conduct that can be found the chief cause of failure, but in the unanticipated yielding of a white regiment from which there was every reason to expect noble service, and at a moment when everything depended upon its firmness. ⁴⁸

In accounting for the white regiment's failure, Seymour pointed out that it was filled with "conscripts and substitutes, of a very inferior class." ⁴⁹ The correspondent for the New York Tribune reported that,

It is probable that after having saved the army from rout, the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts, the First North Carolina, and the Eighth USCT, will have given another element to Congress to withhold from them the pay due to them as soldiers, and to insult them by pressing for the application against them of laws and regulations never intended fairly to apply to their case. ⁵⁰

If it had not been for the black troops, the casualty list would have been much greater. ⁵¹

The black compatriots performed their duty as soldiers with fortitude and gallantry. Regardless of threats from the enemy or inequitable treatment by their own government, they fought with bravery and resoluteness. An unforgettable defeat for the Federals, the Battle of Olustee should be remembered as an example of the African-American's willingness and determination in fighting for his freedom.

The 1st NCCV performed admirably in its first encounter with the Confederates. The men provided further evidence that southern blacks would not bolt in the heat of action. They passed their first test, but the second trial for the regiment was yet to come. The next opportunity would take place later in 1864 outside a small town in South Carolina.

** Go to Chapter 4 **

Footnotes for Chapter 3
1. Ratings for engagements were taken from Frederick Henry Dyer's A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion, 3 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959).
2. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buell, eds., Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Being for the Most Part Contributions by Union and Confederate Officers, based upon The Century War Series, 4 vols. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc., 1956), 4:76.
3. Ibid.
4. Brig. Gen. D. P. Woodbury to Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone, Department Head Quarters, December 23, 1863, ORA, ser.1, 26, pt.1:873-74.
5. Circular Letter, Maj. P. W. White, Commissary Officer, November 1863, ORA, ser.1, 28, pt. 2:472-73.
6. General P.G.T. Beauregard to General S. Cooper, March 31, 1864, ORA, ser.1, 35, pt. 2:392; William H. Nulty, Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1990), 68.
7. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 58-61.
8. Ibid., 75.
9. President Lincoln to Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore, January 13, 1864, ORA, ser. 1, 35, pt.1:278.
10. General H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief, to Maj. Gen. Gillmore, January 22, 1864, ORA, ser.1, 35, pt.1:279.
11. Maj. Gen. Gillmore to General Halleck, January 31, 1864, ORA, ser.1, 35, pt.1:279.
12. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 78.
13. Maj. Gen. Gillmore's report to General Halleck, March 7, 1864, ORA, ser.1, 35, pt.1:276.
14. Ibid., 276-77.
15. Maj. Gen. Truman Seymour to Maj. Gen. Gillmore, February 11, ORA, ser.1, 35, pt.1:281-82.
16. Maj. Gen. Seymour to Maj. Gen. Gillmore, February 17, 1864, ORA, ser.1, 35, pt.1:284.
17. Ibid., 286-87.
18. Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Terry to Lt. Col. E. W. Smith, Assistant Adjutant-General, February 14, 1864, ORA, ser. 1, 35, pt. 1:480-81.
19. Maj. Gen. Gillmore to Maj. Gen. Seymour, Appendix F, February 4, 1864, ORA, ser.1, 35, pt. 1:280.
20. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 119, 121.
21. Johnson and Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4:76.
22. Ibid., 4:77.
23. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 125.
24. New York Times, March 1, 1864, p. 1.
25. Johnson and Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4:80.
26. Ibid., 78.
27. Ibid., 80; Col. Hawley disputed an account given by General Samuel Jones, also found in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, that says the Eighth USCT fled and did not appear again during the rest of the battle.
28. New York Times, March 1, 1864, p. 1.
29. Maj. Gen. Seymour's report to Brig. Gen. John Wesley Turner, Chief of Staff, March 25, 1864, ORA, ser.1, 35, pt.1:289.
30. Frank E. Moore , ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, with Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, Etc.: With an Introductory Address by Edward Everett, 11 vols. (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1861-68), 8:411.
31. New York Times, March 1, 1864, p. 1.
32. Moore, The Rebellion Record, 8:410.
33. Col. James C. Beecher to Maj. F. W. Taggard, July 22, 1864, Order Book, 35th Regiment United States Colored Troops (USCT), Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
34. New York Tribune, March 1, 1864, p. 1.
35. Return of casualties in the engagement near Olustee, Fla., February 20, 1864, Maj. Gen. Seymour, commanding, ORA, ser.1, 35, pt. 1:298.
36. New York Times, March 1, 1864, p.1.
37. Johnson and Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4:80.
38. Ibid.
39. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 118, 119.
40. Louis F. Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment: History of the Fifty-Fourth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1863-1865 (Boston: Boston Book Company, 1894; reprint, New York: Johnson Reprint Corp, 1968), 172 (page references are to reprint edition).
41. Maj. Gen. Seymour's report to Brig. Gen. Turner, March 25, 1864, ORA, ser.1, 35, pt.1:289-90.
42. Ibid., 291.
43. Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 10-11.
44. Hondon B. Hargrove, Black Union Soldiers in the Civil War (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1988), 167.
45. General John P. Hatch to General E. A. Hitchcock, September 25, 1864, ORA, ser. 2, 7:876.
46. Nulty, Confederate Florida, 161.
47. Ibid., 219.
48. Maj. Gen. Seymour's report to Brig. Gen. Turner, March 25, 1864, ORA, ser. 1, 35, pt.1:290.
49. Ibid.
50. New York Tribune, March 1, 1864, p.1.
51. Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment, 162-63.

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